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Abstract 
This paper provides a review entrepreneurial finance in emerging industries. First we 
examined literature to create a view of industrial emergence with reference to systems 
thinking.  We then explored the role of entrepreneurial finance in emerging industries, and 
whether it can theoretically slow or accelerate industrial emergence through reference to the 
literature. We find the link between entrepreneurial finance and industrial emergence is not a 
simple relationship of more finance generates more innovation and industrial emergence.  
Key words: Industrial emergence, entrepreneurial finance, investment, industry evolution 
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1 Introduction 
„The financial crash of 2008-9 has been the most damaging economic event since the 
Great Depression – affecting the lives of hundreds of millions of people.‟ (Turner, 
Haldane et al. 2010) 
While debates continue on how to avoid a repeat of the most recent financial crash, almost all 
opinions include the view that investment in some types of innovation offers opportunities for 
economic growth which can aid economic recovery1. In this paper we explore the constituents 
and dynamics of industrial emergence as a basis from which to examine the role of finance in 
industrial emergence, with particular emphasis on the financing of new firms. Emerging 
industries have been defined as:  
 „... newly formed or re-formed industries that have been created by technological 
innovations, shifts in relative cost relationships, emergence of new consumer needs, 
or other economic and sociological changes that elevate a new product or service to 
the level of a potentially viable business opportunity.‟ (Porter Competitive Strategy 
p.215) 
We build on this view of industrial emergence by examining how new ideas come to have a 
wider economic impact via the firm, and how firms come together to form part of a new, or 
emerging industry.  
Global aggregate data on investment in innovation has shown a decline in recent years raising 
questions over the impact this will have on innovative capacity. The UK has R&D intensity
2
 
of less 2%, which is below both the UK government‟s own target of 2.5% and the EU target 
of 3% of GDP. Bank lending to SMEs has continued weakening in 2010 and the rate of 
growth in lending has remained negative in 2011, though credit conditions had improved for 
larger companies when compared to the previous year (BoE 2010; BoE 2011).  Global 
aggregate data shows a sharp reduction in the amount of venture capital available in addition 
to an increasing reliance on public funds that now participate in around 42% of deals in the 
UK (Pierrakis 2010). Seed investment has declined over the last decade, perhaps reflecting 
poor returns for early stage investments (BVCA 2010). Times to exit, from initial investment 
to IPO or M&A, have increased across industries, now averaging 7.5 years (Pierrakis 2010). 
Furthermore comparisons with the U.S. make the performance of European entrepreneurial 
finance seem inferior with average internal rates of returns (IRRs) comparatively lower 
(Figure 1). In an increasingly globalised world, investors are likely to move their activities 
where they can achieve the highest returns, regardless of „traditional‟ geographic 
considerations such as proximity to existing facilities or other investments..  
                                                 
1 For example the „sustainability revolution‟ and the need for cleantech investment to spur on a new growth industry (Stern 
2006).  
 
2 R&D intensity is defined as the % of GDP invested in research and development 
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Figure 1 Average fund IRRs according to cumulative year performance (as it is cumulative vintage 
year performance, figures for 2004 onwards may be incomplete) (Source: Thomson One) 
In the wake of financial constraints in public and private spending, understanding how to 
maximise innovative output with fewer financial resources is of critical importance. 
Increasingly the case is made for governments to intervene and fill perceived entrepreneurial 
funding shortages, for example in early stage investments (Reed 2010). In the UK and US, 
the importance of supporting the emergence of new industries has been identified as a key 
component in economic recovery (NAP 2007; Turner, Haldane et al. 2010).  But will support 
for entrepreneurial finance also help support the emergence of new industries? We explore 
the mechanics of industrial change to examine the contribution of finance towards industry 
creation. Of concern is the ability to direct investment to firms and industries with the most 
potential for growth and positive impact on the economy. This paper sets out the main 
schools of literature to inform whether industry emergence can in theory be accelerated or 
slowed depending on the amount and type of finance available. It begins with a brief 
overview of industrial dynamics, followed by an exploration of the processes leading to 
industrial change. This leads to a closer inspection of the role of finance on the emergence of 
industries. 
2 Industrial emergence 
Although innovation has often been categorised as a one-way linear flow from R&D to new 
products, studies have shown the process of innovation to be less structured and to involve 
multiple interactions and networks (Freeman 1992; Malecki 2000; Foxon, Gross et al. 2005). 
While the linear model has theoretical elegance the majority of studies suggest more dynamic 
and complex processes involved in innovation and industrial emergence. 
2.1 Knowledge and innovation 
Information and knowledge tend to share features with public goods i.e. more than one 
person can hold an idea or repeat it (unless patented or copyrighted). The science base has 
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typically been associated with the generation of new knowledge. Historically much science 
was viewed as „publicly supported scientific commons‟ (Nelson, 2004 p.455) readily 
available for further exploration and exploitation. While much of the knowledge residing 
within the science base used to spillover into the business environment, research is 
increasingly privately funded, and many Universities have introduced formal technology 
transfer offices. With progressively more privatisation of the „scientific commons‟ questions 
arise regarding how this impacts the evolution of industries (Dosi, Llerena et al. 2006).  
While science is often viewed as a predecessor to technology and its application within a 
commercial setting, at times practical inventions have arisen before the scientific 
understanding of why they worked (e.g. steam engine, airplane)(Dosi, Llerena et al. 2006). 
Technological advances can be essential to scientific advances, for example in 
instrumentation. Typically there is interaction between science and technology which can 
advance both. However it has been suggested that since the industrial revolution, the relative 
contribution of science to technology has been increasing and its impact has become more 
and more pervasive (Perez 2004; Dosi, Llerena et al. 2006).   Companies increasingly source 
knowledge from a variety of sources at home and abroad (Figure 2). For example recent 
studies show the importance of „soft companies‟3 as intermediaries, collaborators and 
originators of new knowledge (Connell and Probert 2010). 
 
Figure 2 Frequency of knowledge sourcing by types of external sources and their locations (Huggins, 
Izushi et al. 2010) p.14 
Measuring the contribution of science to innovation and emerging industries remains 
challenging. Aggregate data indicates a slight fall in UK R&D intensity over the last ten years 
                                                 
3 The authors define a soft company as a science or technology based company whose business model is to provide R&D 
based services (e.g. technical consulting, contract R&D) and which draws on its expertise and/or proprietary technologies to 
provide bespoke offerings for a range of customers and applications. 
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(Figure 3). This aggregate number includes a variety of R&D instruments, including public 
sector contracts. The link between R&D intensity and innovative output is not direct, though 
perhaps indicative as suggested by the UK innovation scorecard (Figure 4). Innovation 
scorecards include other factors in addition to R&D spend (InnoMetrics 2011). But country 
wide data masks industry or regional specific activities. In the UK a recent report suggests 
public sector contracts have not typically been awarded to ventures associated with a high 
proportion of breakthrough or radical innovations especially when compared to the U.S. 
(Connell and Probert 2010). Other studies indicate a positive correlation with R&D spend and 
economic performance of a country (Marrano, Haskel et al. 2007; Lane 2008), but only up to 
1.5% as a proportion of GDP (Gill, Minshall et al. 2007). High corporate R&D spend as a 
percentage of sales are typically associated with high technology industries such as 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 3 R&D intensity (Source: World Bank
4
) 
 
                                                 
4 http://data.worldbank.org/  
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Figure 4 UK Innovation Scorecard 2010 (BIS 2011) 
So while science can contribute knowledge which opens up potential opportunities for new 
technological trajectories, knowledge is used in a variety of ways: 
„...inventions can occur at any time, with different importance and at varying rhythms. 
Not all of them become innovations and not all innovations diffuse widely. In fact, the 
world of the technically feasible is always much greater than that of the economically 
profitable, and this, in turn, is much greater than that of the socially acceptable.‟ 
(Perez 2004) p.219  
As this study focuses on the commercial development of innovation, it is suggested that 
factors influencing the emergence of an industry occur predominantly outside the science 
base assuming a certain threshold of activity is achieved. Knowledge does not create 
economic value by itself, but rather has the potential of economic value creation if it is 
absorbed and developed by firms (Hussler, Picard et al. 2010). 
2.2 Firms 
Typically there are long lags between original „discoveries‟ and their useful commercial 
applications due to the nature of technology: 
„most technology is specific, complex....[and] cumulative in its development... It is 
specific to firms where most technological activity is carried out, and it is specific to 
products and processes, since most of the expenditure is not on research, but on 
development and production engineering, after which knowledge is also accumulated 
through experience in production and use on what has come to be known as “learning-
by-doing” and “learning-by-using”‟ (Pavitt, 1987 p.9 cited in Dosi et al. 2006 p.1451) 
While the bulk of innovations are carried out by existing firms, these tend to be incremental 
and focused on lowering costs and raising performance within existing business opportunities 
(Christensen 1997). Existing firms are often associated with competence enhancing 
innovations which add value to existing expertise (Tushman and Anderson 1986; Christensen 
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1997). The emergence of new industries is however associated with a suite of radical and 
competence destroying innovations and new entrants (Utterback 1994; Freeman and Louca 
2002). 
While much work has focused on improving the ability of established firms to introduce 
radical innovations, new entrants and smaller firms continue to have features which make 
them suitable for the introduction of radical innovations and the emergence of industries. 
They tend to be fast movers and learners and so able to respond quickly to changing 
opportunities, as occurs during turbulent and uncertain periods of industrial emergence. 
Corporations try to gain these benefits through Corporate Venturing which focuses on the 
creation of new businesses within or outside the corporate organisation (Narayanan, Yang et 
al. 2009). Industries frequently emerge in niches largely ignored by established industry, 
where early feedback on new products and services can be obtained while avoiding the need 
for capital intensive activities associated with mass production (Chandler 1990).  
Not all new firms are associated with high growth. A recent study indicates fast-growing new 
firms tend to originate from a rise in the proportion of employment of scientists and engineers 
versus employment in sales and production in industries (Eckhardt and Shane 2010). High 
growth5 firms are reported to represent just 6 per cent of all UK firms employing ten or more 
people (Anyadike-Danes, Bonner et al. 2009). The majority (80%) of high-growth firms 
employed fewer than 50 people, and firms under five years old were responsible for a fifth of 
the increase in employment (Anyadike-Danes, Bonner et al. 2009). A study at the cluster 
level also showed the disproportionate impact on employment in the cluster as a result of 
high growth firms (Garnsey and Mohr 2010)6. Few firms become high growth immediately 
after inception, and most experience irregular growth paths making predicting which firms 
become high growth challenging (Heffernan and Garnsey 2002; Acs, Parsons et al. 2008). 
Nonetheless new firms are associated with a variety of generating processes (Stam and 
Garnsey 2005) that are an essential part of change, as identified in evolutionary studies 
(Metcalfe 1998).  
While it is recognised that a variety of firms contribute towards the emergence of an industry, 
entrepreneurial endeavour and high growth firms are key dynamic elements which prompt 
wider changes of the kind that can lead to industrial emergence. We focus this study on firms 
with potential for high growth. How firms perform the translational task of commercialising 
technology is now discussed. 
                                                 
5 The report defines „high-growth‟ as a 20% increase in employment in any one year. Gazelles are those less than 5 years 
old. 
6 Firm growth contributed two thirds of all new job creation in the Cambridge tech cluster between 1988-2008 versus entries 
and exits that contributed a third. (Garnsey and Mohr 2010) 
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Figure 5 The contribution of high-growth firms to job creation (10+ employees) (Anyadike-Danes, 
Bonner et al. 2009) p.4 (Original source: ONS Business Structure Database) 
2.2.1 Innovation as an entrepreneurial matching process 
For successful diffusion in the market, technological innovation consists of a matching 
process between technological capabilities and market opportunities (Freeman 1982 p.109). 
This matching process includes „learning by doing‟ and „learning by using‟ (Foxon, Gross et 
al. 2005). The entrepreneurial process is fundamental to technological change, and yet is 
sometimes treated as a „black box‟ in the innovation management literature (Jaffe, Newell et 
al. 2001). Yet it is this entrepreneurial process within either an existing or new firm which 
builds a commercial structure around an innovation with the aim of creating and capturing 
value. By definition an innovation is distinct from an invention through its link to productive 
opportunity: 
„The productive activities of such a firm are governed by what we shall call its 
„productive opportunity‟, which comprises all of the productive possibilities that its 
„entrepreneurs‟ see and can take advantage of.‟ (Penrose 1995) p.31 
The innovation is then a resource which may allow a firm to take advantage of a productive 
opportunity, depending on how it is developed and used: 
„Strictly speaking, it is never resources themselves that are the „inputs‟ in the 
production process, but only the services that the resources can render. The services 
yielded by resources are a function of the way in which they are used – exactly the 
same resource when used for different purposes or in different ways and in 
combination with different types or amounts of other resources provides a different 
service or set of services.‟ (Penrose 1995) p.25  
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For example it has been shown that entrepreneurs do not discover the same opportunities in 
response to a given technological change (e.g. a new intellectual property right) since these 
perceived opportunities are shaped by idiosyncratic information and other resources7 specific 
to the entrepreneur (Shane 2000)
8
. 
The idea of „opportunity‟ has attracted academic interest, with particular emphasis on 
„entrepreneurial opportunity‟ (Ardichvili, Cardozo et al. 2003; Eckhardt and Shane 2003). 
Shane and Venkataraman (2000) posit that the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities is 
a subjective process, but that opportunities themselves are objective phenomena that are not 
known to all parties at all times. They specify the entrepreneurial element: 
„Entrepreneurial opportunities differ from the larger set of all opportunities for profit, 
particularly opportunities to enhance the efficiency of existing goods, services, raw 
materials, and organizing methods, because the former require the discovery of new 
means-ends relationships whereas the latter involve optimisation within existing 
means-ends frameworks (Kirzner, 1997)‟ (Shane and Venkataraman 2000 p.220) 
There has been disagreement in the literature as to whether opportunities are created or 
discovered (Dutta and Crossan 2005). By viewing the entrepreneurial opportunity as a 
developmental process, contrasting definitions of the phenomena can start to be resolved. If 
the entrepreneurial opportunity is conceptualised as „market needs, 
unemployed/underemployed resources‟ then the entrepreneurial developmental process is 
trivialised (Dee 2008). Contrastingly, if the entrepreneurial opportunity is conceptualised as 
something that can support a successful enterprise, the developmental process is emphasised 
(Ardichvili, Cardozo et al. 2003). This is because the entrepreneurial process of developing 
an opportunity occurs between the identification of market needs and unemployed/ 
underemployed resources and the successful enterprise (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6 From a market need to a successful enterprise (Ardichvili et al. 2003 p.112) 
For an opportunity to be entrepreneurial it is suggested that it must be linked to expectations 
of value creation and capture, and therefore the emergence of a successful enterprise 
                                                 
7 Finance is an example of a resource which could constrain or enable a particular strategy to secure a productive 
opportunity. 
8 In this study, entrepreneurs perceived different business opportunities from exploiting the same MIT invention. 
Successful 
Enterprises 
Businesses 
Formed 
Business Plans 
Business Concepts 
Market Needs, Un/Under Employed Resources 
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(Garnsey 2005). Value creation and capture depend not only on the activities of the firm, but 
also its relationship to the business environment (e.g. competitors, complementary 
technologies, regulations, customers etc.). We therefore emphasise the importance of the 
entrepreneurial process within entrepreneurial opportunities for understanding the link 
between innovation and the wider business environment. 
2.3 Industry and institutional infrastructure 
An innovation alone does not create a new industry. Rather it is a constellation of innovations 
that are part of „systemic changes in the logic of the co-ordination process of the large and 
interrelated techno-economic or socio-institutional systems‟ that contribute towards an 
evolving structure (Freeman and Louca 2002) p.41. Industries emerge as part of this evolving 
structure and depend not just on an accumulation of firms acting on related entrepreneurial 
opportunities, but also the emergence of industry and institutional structures (Van de Ven 
1993; Aldrich and Fiol 1994). 
In practice the emergence of an industry remains difficult to identify and assign to a 
particular time period, particularly as: 
„…boundaries of industry begin to blur as substitute products are developed in other 
industries, and as technologies fuse together to form new products and product 
categories‟ (Bettis and Hitt, 1995) 
Building an industry can be just as important for an organisation as building its own 
organisation. While this may seem counterintuitive, since a thriving industry brings 
competition, it is often recognised by pioneer firms as instrumental to industry growth (Dee 
2008). In an industry‟s formative years: 
„From an institutional and ecological perspective, founders of new ventures [in new 
industries] appear to be fools, for they are navigating, at best, in an institutional 
vacuum of indifferent munificence and, at worst, in a hostile environment impervious 
to individual action, in addition to the normal pressures facing any new organisations, 
they also must carve out a new market, raise capital from sceptical sources, recruit 
untrained employees, and cope with other difficulties stemming from their nascent 
status.‟ (Aldrich and Fiol 1994) p.645 
The risk of „pioneer burnout‟ in new industries suggests pioneers bear the costs of advertising 
but the benefits of advertising can be appropriated by other founders entering the market later 
(Mowery and Rosenberg 1998; Rao 2004). Industries, like firms, may emerge but this does 
not secure an inevitable life-cycle where they mature and thrive. Industries may fail shortly 
after emergence, or stagnate within a niche market.  
The emergence of institutional structures requires institutional activists to campaign and 
convince others of their view as: 
„A new industry becomes taken for granted only when actors do not question the 
value of the industry, do not have doubts about the usefulness of the radical new 
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product underlying the industry and do not even think of alternatives‟ (Zucker, 
1983)(Rao 2004) p.360 
Van de Van‟s components of community infrastructure for innovation vary between 
industries and geographies but show the many factors which institutional activists can 
influence.  
Components of community infrastructure for innovation 
Institutional arrangements 
- Legitimation (creation of trust) 
- Governance (norms, rules, regulations, laws) 
- Technology standards 
Resource endowments 
- Scientific/technological research 
- Financing and insurance arrangements 
- Human competence pool (training and accreditation) 
Proprietary functions 
- Technological development functions: R&D, testing, manufacturing, marketing 
- Innovation network/resource channel activities: appropriation of common goods (science, finance, labour) vendor-
supplier-distributor channels 
- Market creation and consumer demand 
Figure 7 A social system framework for understanding innovation development and industry emergence (Van de 
Ven 1993) p.341 
Industrial emergence will be impacted by the infrastructure for innovation specific to each 
industry, location and time. Cultural differences affect the approach and acceptability of 
different styles of government. Government influences the structure of appropriability 
regimes, markets, legal and tax structures etc., which are all of concern to investors (Spencer, 
Murtha et al. 2005). 
A country‟s specific cultural, legal and regulatory environment impacts incentives and costs 
to innovation and entrepreneurial finance (Hall 2005). For example, appropriability regimes 
not only vary between countries but also influence the perception of achievable returns from 
innovation. The premise that private gains from innovation are necessary for entrepreneurs 
and business firms to undertake expensive and time consuming search and development of 
innovation is accepted as a feature of modern capitalism (Dosi, Marengo et al. 2006). 
However appropriability can be achieved in a variety of ways by securing inimitable 
knowledge and/or know how in different domains (Teece 1986; Teece 2006). Appropriability 
extends far beyond legal appropriation mechanisms like copyrighting and intellectual 
property rights. However the full range of mechanisms of appropriability are not all 
measurable and as such innovation is often associated with patenting as it is readily 
identifiable and publicly recorded.  
Intellectual property regimes vary between countries and industries, and evolve over time. 
Often stronger intellectual property regimes are assumed to lead to a higher rate of 
investment in innovation resulting in more innovation. However this assumption is 
challenged by research suggesting it is at best a second order effect, and at worst a hindrance 
to innovation when too strong a regime is enforced (Levin, Klevorick et al. 1987; Dosi, 
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Marengo et al. 2006). For example the software industry emerged under a weak IP regime, 
the transistor was also liberally licensed, yet both experienced rapid innovation and growth 
(Dosi, Marengo et al. 2006). It is also possible that different strengths in IP regime and 
appropriability are relevant at different stages in the industry life cycle. Once again we are 
reminded that securing a patent does not secure a business. It is rather the entrepreneurial 
process which depends on the people and resources within a firm in conjunction with features 
of an emerging business environment that determine how an idea is developed and ultimately 
commercialised.  
While it seems evident that the institutional structure surrounding an industry may affect the 
scope and scale of its emergence, this too unfolds over time. Whether the location of an 
emerging industry is dependent on favourable institutional structures specific to that industry 
remains uncertain. For example work on clusters indicates an industry can emerge quite 
unexpectedly in an area as a result of the location of one „exemplary‟ firm (Klepper 2010). 
With increasing globalisation, the emergence of industry may not be restricted by a particular 
country‟s regime, but instead move so that a science base in one country may lead to the 
emergence of an industry in another. As people and companies become more mobile, and as 
funding for R&D originates progressively more from international sources, questions are 
raised about the efficacy of public support for innovation which may be commercialised 
elsewhere (Bloom and Griffith 2001).  
This brief view of the system of innovation positions industry emergence within a much 
broader spectrum of activities. This review has emphasised the complex process which 
contributes to the emergence of industries, and the need for a multi-level analysis (Phaal, 
O'Sullivan et al. 2010). While new and established firms are identified as important, new 
ventures have been identified as a disproportionately important variety generating 
mechanism. We now discuss the dynamics of industrial emergence and change. 
3 Industrial dynamics 
Studying change at the industry level presents theoretical and empirical challenges (Forbes 
and Kirsch 2010). These challenges relate to complexity and boundary problems associated 
with an industry level analysis, further complicated when trying to identify the emergence of 
an industry which adds temporal uncertainty as to its beginning and end. Perhaps reflecting 
these difficulties it has been estimated that fewer than 10% of entrepreneurship articles 
published over the last two decades focus on the industry level of analysis (Chandler and 
Lyon, 2001 in Forbes).  
There are broadly two relevant streams of research: industry life cycle dynamics which 
focuses on market structure and the entry, growth and decline of firms; and industry 
evolution which encompasses a broader view including the nature of knowledge and 
institutional change (Malerba 2007). Several studies converge on the view that a life cycle 
starts with a radical innovation through the entry of new producers, followed by demand 
growth, a greater emphasis on process innovations and a selection process from which 
emerges a concentrated market structure (Utterback and Suarez 1993; Utterback and Allan 
2000). This model appears to apply most appropriately to manufacturing settings where 
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dominant designs emerge. As an industry emerges, firms tend to focus on product innovation 
and matching this to customer needs. As an industry matures process innovation is critical as 
firms compete on price (Utterback 1994). Recent work suggests some industries then move 
into an additional phase of service innovations (Cusumano, Kahl et al. 2006). 
This „systems‟9 approach extends beyond the role of firms as industries change to include 
other factors in the business environment such as institutional change. Historical studies have 
revealed the importance of „systems of innovation‟, for example complex supply networks 
and complementary innovations in the emergence of electric power, railway and 
telecommunications systems (Mowery and Rosenberg 1998; Nairn 2002). Work on systems 
of innovation overlaps with long wave research (Freeman and Louca 2002; Perez 2004), and 
includes evolutionary models of industrial change. Empirical evidence for industry evolution 
and life-cycles has been derived from analyzing industrial dynamics of innovation (e.g. 
number of firms, market concentration, etc.) in addition to econometric approaches (& 
cliometrics), and „history friendly models‟ (Malerba 2007). Such empirical evidence supports 
a heuristic model10 of paradigmatic shifts characterised by different phases: the laboratory 
invention phase; decisive demonstrations of technical and commercial feasibility; explosive 
take off and growth during a turbulent phase of structural crisis in the economy and 
politically; continued high growth with system now accepted as common sense; slow-down 
and erosion of profitability as the system matures and is challenged by newer technologies; 
maturity and decline, with some „renaissance‟ effects from new technologies (Freeman and 
Louca 2002). 
While new industries represent an important context in which firms and nations compete, it 
has been suggested that more work is needed to better understand the unfolding of key 
processes in emerging industries across a range of actors (Forbes and Kirsch 2010). 
Evolutionary models recognise variety generation and selection as interactive processes 
which determine the propagation of patterns of industrial activity (Nelson and Winter 1982; 
Nelson 1995). However disagreements remain, for example regarding appropriate units of 
selection. Feedback mechanisms such as dynamic increasing returns can cause unexpected 
outcomes, for example when: 
 The technology is cumulative (Nelson 1995). When there are several plausible 
technologies, inventors may focus on one or develop a breakthrough by chance. This 
chance event results in a perceived gap in performance capabilities between the 
plausible technologies. 
 Network externalities (David 1993). When a technology demands consumer learning 
for its operation, the technology can become locked-in. For example: the QWERTY 
keyboard, despite arguments for ergonomic inefficiency, has become the dominant 
design for keyboards since it depends on consumer learning for efficient use.  
                                                 
9 Since the 1970s much of the work from the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex has greatly 
contributed to work on systems of innovation and industry evolution. This group has included Christopher Freeman, 
Giovanni Dosi, Richard Nelson, Luc Soete, Keith Pavitt, Carolota Perez. It is now called the Science and Technology Policy 
Research. 
10 „It is full of exceptions and of huge independent events that constantly twist and break the proposed regularity.‟ (Perez 
p.49 Tech and finance). 
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 Requirement of complementary technologies (Nelson 1995; Kemp and Schot 1998). 
The gasoline internal combustion engine required a road and fuelling infrastructure as 
well as mechanics trained to deal with automobile problems in order to run. 
It is perhaps not surprising that complexity including unanticipated consequences and 
feedback effects lead to uncertainty.  
Both evolutionary and industrial life cycle approaches link industry emergence with high 
levels of uncertainty:  
„Early in the history of an industry – when knowledge is changing very rapidly, 
uncertainty is very high, and barriers to entry very low – new firms are the major 
innovators and are the key elements in industrial dynamics.‟ (Malerba 2006) p.383 
The link between risk and uncertainty has been debated, particularly as uncertainty may 
introduce a randomness to economic modelling (Davidson 1991)11. Knight famously 
distinguished risk from uncertainty by stating that a probability of outcomes could be 
assigned to risk, but not to uncertainty12. Or as Keynes described: 
"By „uncertain‟ knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what 
is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, 
in this sense, to uncertainty...The sense in which I am using the term is that in which 
the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of 
interest twenty years hence...About these matters there is no scientific basis on which 
to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know." (J.M. Keynes, 
1937) 
Early in the stages of industry emergence this type of uncertainty seems particularly evident, 
and is associated with technology, market, regulatory and institutional uncertainty13 (Aldrich 
and Fiol 1994; Freeman and Louca 2002; Malerba 2006). However the range of outcomes 
possible from conditions of uncertainty are likely to be tempered by path dependencies (i.e. 
history matters) within the business environment (David 1993; Nelson 1995). 
Industries are an important context in which firms and nations compete and which present 
different challenges and opportunities depending on their phase of evolution, geography and 
specific industry characteristics (Freeman and Louca 2002; Forbes and Kirsch 2010). How 
long industry emergence occurs is a subject of debate, but it is considered „one temporal 
component, or interval, within an “industry life cycle” model of how industries evolve over 
time‟ (McGahan et al. 2004 in Forbes p.3). 
                                                 
11 http://homepage.newschool.edu/het//essays/uncert/intrisk.htm  
12 Whether in real life you can ever ascertain the „odds‟ or probability of different outcomes has been much discussed e.g. 
Taleb (2008).  
13 This uncertainty is connected to a need for variety generation to avoid premature lock-in of a solution that will lead to an 
inferior technology stream of industrial emergence 
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Having explored the main constituents and dynamics of industrial emergence, we investigate 
the role of finance and how it may impact the emergence of industries. We do this with a 
view that emerging industries are characterised by highly uncertain business environments. 
4 Emerging Industries and their relationship with Investment 
This section explores theoretical contributions towards understanding the role of finance for 
new ventures and emerging industries. As has already been discussed, this involves 
consideration of a large complex system involving a multitude of actors/units across multiple 
levels of analysis. We will therefore focus on key levers of industrial emergence as identified 
from the previous sections. We will structure this around three main areas. Concerns 
regarding private under-investment in innovation have been related to lack of incentives to 
invest (imperfect markets for knowledge) and the lack of means to invest (imperfect capital 
markets) from a market failure perspective with an investor-centric approach (Peneder 2008). 
This approach relates well to policy which tends to take a market failure perspective and as a 
result offer „market corrections‟ to enhance investment incentives and stimulate the capital 
markets (Gill, Minshall et al. 2007; Peneder 2008). We explore both of these investor-centric 
perspectives in addition to firm incentives to seek external sources of finance. 
4.1 Incentives to seek external sources of finance 
Prior to securing revenue from a perceived entrepreneurial opportunity, research and 
development (R&D) is often required. Finance is a flexible resource which offers the means 
of acquiring other necessary resources during the R&D process. R&D can be funded through 
a variety of financial instruments, from the firm‟s own financial resources, to grants, debt and 
equity finance. From the firm perspective, a „pecking order‟ has been recognised when it 
comes to preferences of finance (Casson, Martin et al. 2008). This pecking order relates to the 
idea that firms‟ owners will try and use the least amount of effort to raise sources of finance, 
and links to information asymmetries and control rights (Myers and Majluf 1984). This 
suggests firms prefer using grants first, then internal funds (e.g. from cash flow or personal 
finance), followed by debt finance and last by equity finance. 
New firms can alleviate the need for external sources of finance through access to early 
revenue streams or delaying the venture creation process if research and development can 
continue in another organisation e.g. corporation, university, technology consultancy. It has 
been suggested that governments have focused too much on the inputs of research and 
development and finance to the entrepreneurial process, and not enough on value creation and 
capture through „venturesome‟ customers (Bhide 2006). One such customer for new ventures 
may be the public sector.  However, while the U.S. government is a valued customer to many 
SMEs and a critical first customer for many ventures through the Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) programme
14
, there have been problems emulating the scheme in the UK 
(Connell 2006). In the absence of sufficient revenue from sales, the high growth firm usually 
seeks external sources of finance. 
                                                 
14 http://www.sbir.gov/ 
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A variety of grants is available for new firms and new projects to undertake market research, 
R&D and expansion. These are often a favoured source of finance as they provide a non-
repayable lump sum15. A UK survey of grant applicants suggests16 many projects would not 
have been undertaken without being awarded a grant (Figure 8) (PACEC 2009).  
 
Figure 8 Would your project have gone ahead if you had not received an award? (PACEC 2009) 
While broadly empirical evidence supports the pecking order theory17, there remain questions 
about whether it relates to highly innovative and high growth firms (Peneder 2008). For high 
growth firms, empirical evidence suggests a reversal of the „pecking order‟ with a higher 
reliance on equity finance than would otherwise be expected (Peneder 2008). Even when 
grants are available, these are rarely sufficient to fund high growth. The structure of the UK 
banking sector is generally regarded as inappropriate for widespread provision of debt 
financing for smaller firms owing to problems assessing and monitoring their progress 
(HMTreasury and BIS 2010). Further problems securing debt finance are attributed to a 
limited ownership of tangible assets coupled with uncertainties of cashflow in new firms 
(Cowling and Murray 2010). The availability of bank finance also fluctuates depending on 
the state of the economy and changing industry standards (Figure 9). This has caused the 
perception of a financing gap that affects high growth firms, „a limited number of firms, but it 
is precisely these companies that bear the highest potential to drive economic development 
through radical innovations‟ (Peneder 2008) p.522.  
                                                 
15 The main cost to firms is in the search and application process for the grants, which if excessive can negate the benefits of 
a grant. Compliance costs are also non-trivial as failure to demonstrate adherence to the terms of the grant may result in a 
demand for repayment. 
16 It is likely that many survey respondents would want to encourage continued public support of grants which might have 
led to an exaggerated figure. 
17 64% of companies that expected to grow in the coming years stated that they would prefer to apply for a bank loan rather 
than seek equity funding (p.9 Gallup Organisation 2009) 
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Figure 9 Lending to UK businesses – sectoral breakdown of quarterly net lending flows by UK 
Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) (Source: Bank of England
18
) 
Equity financing mainly refers to business angel finance and venture capital finance, both of 
which arose out of the particular financing needs of high growth, high perceived risk ventures 
(O'Sullivan 2006). Few enterprises are high-growth with venture capital funding just 0.01% 
of nascent entrepreneurs (Reynolds, Bygrave et al. 2003). Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) 
has modelled itself on venture capital and offers another source of finance for ventures. 
Business angel investment has become more organised and recognised as a key source of 
finance for entrepreneurs over the last twenty years, especially earlier stage investments 
(Mason and Harrison 2010) (Figure 10 & Figure 11).  Venture capitalists and business angels 
increasingly offer some debt finance in addition to equity finance (Denis 2004). These 
sources of finance are structured according to different risk/reward profiles associated with 
varying stages of product development and commercialisation (Figure 12). 
                                                 
18 www.bankofengland.co.uk  
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Figure 10 BBA p.30 (Mason and Harrison 2010)
19
 
How entrepreneurs choose what type of investment they need depends on what is available in 
parallel with other perceived benefits and contractual issues. In addition to the financial cost 
and benefit (e.g. interest on a loan), angel and venture investors demand equity (e.g. through 
convertible preferred stock) which often dilutes an entrepreneurs shareholding (Hall 2005). 
Contracts may also include covenants for staged financing, rights of first refusal, anti-dilution 
clauses, board rights and so on (Denis 2004). Many investors also provide support via access 
to expertise and contacts that can demonstrably help the new venture development. All these 
factors influence the incentives for entrepreneurs to secure finance. 
Organised equity finance is a fairly recent phenomenon compared to the history of industrial 
emergence. Throughout history, even before the emergence of venture capital, entrepreneurs 
have been successful at building businesses and contributing towards the emergence of 
industries. Entrepreneurs are often associated with resourcefulness capable of overcoming or 
circumventing potential barriers (Hugo and Garnsey 2005): 
 „...it is difficult to identify a single factor that can account for entrepreneurs‟ ongoing 
ability to secure financing for their ventures. Indeed, perhaps the most striking aspect 
of the record of innovation over American economic history is the flexibility that 
technologically creative entrepreneurs have exhibited in adjusting their business and 
career plans so as to obtain financing for, and extract the returns from, their projects.‟ 
p.27 (Nairn 2002) 
                                                 
19 The BBAA includes a review of the performance of business angel networks. While not all business angels use networks 
or syndicates, around a quarter use networks for all their investments, and 40% made some of their investments through such 
networks (Mason and Harrison 2010 p.35). 
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It is perhaps the hope that more organised equity finance removes the need for entrepreneurs 
to have specific fund raising skills, when they could be engaged in firm and industry building 
activities. But even with organised entrepreneurial finance the need to raise funds seems to be 
a cause for concern as it regularly diverts entrepreneurial activity away from value creation 
and capture activities. We now go on to discuss incentives to invest and the means to invest 
from an investor centric perspective in more detail. 
 
Figure 11 UK Investment by financing stage (BVCA) 
 
Figure 12 Adapting the risk/reward ratio: Angel and venture investors only accept higher risks if their 
intervention can convert higher risks to higher rewards (Gill, Minshall et al. 2007) p.46) 
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4.2 Incentives to invest 
The main incentive for the majority of investors is to secure a competitive financial return. 
These returns compete against alternative investment opportunities as venture fund-managers 
(VCs) serve not only entrepreneurs, but also a pool of investors who supply capital to VCs: 
„But what determines the supply of venture capital? Simple: the willingness of 
investors to provide money to venture firms. This willingness in turn hinges on the 
kinds of returns these investors expect to receive from their venture activity compared 
with what they think they can earn from other investments...‟ (Gompers and Lerner 
2001) p.119 
As the majority of investors are interested in securing competitive financial returns, we can 
identify several factors that impact returns and therefore the incentives of investors. For 
instance, while financial returns are the most used success measure in corporate venture 
capital (CVC), many also need to maintain a relationship and interactions with the parent 
corporation which can influence their incentives to invest (EY 2010).  
Pipeline 
As discussed in the previous section, different kinds of finance are appropriate for different 
firms, and external equity finance like venture capital, corporate venture capital and angel 
funding all seek ventures with potential for high growth. Many equity investments have a 
strong regional focus reflecting the need to be located near perceived potential investments 
(Mason and Perrakis 2009)(Figure 13). It has been reported that many VCs tend to shift from 
being a generalist to adopting more of a sector focus as the organisation matures, which can 
result in a wider geographic focus (Mason and Perrakis 2009). While UK government has 
introduced regional venture capital funds in areas not know for availability of equity finance, 
this approach has not proved effective in stimulating indigenous entrepreneurship (Mason 
and Perrakis 2009). Entrepreneurs have also been known to relocate in order to access 
appropriate finance (Zook 2005 in Mason and Perrakis 2009 p.28). 
   
24 
 
 
Figure 13 US Venture Capital Investment by Region (Source: PWC Money Tree) 
Measuring investment performance 
A common measure of return on investment is the internal rate of return (IRR). The IRR 
fluctuates over time and across different stages of investment (Figure 1). The IRR has been 
criticised for incentivising the wrong type of behaviour as it can mislead investors about the 
attractiveness of a project as „internal rates of return conflate rewards for risk with returns for 
patience‟ (Kay 2010). Nonetheless the IRR remains a popular instrument for indicating the 
success or failure of an investment which can be applied to individual investments or a 
portfolio of investments. While IRRs are often projected by investment funds to attract 
capital, these projections are inevitably uncertain. 
Returns vary depending on several factors including stage of investment, time and location of 
investment, and sector focus. For example returns from earlier stage investments have been 
particularly poor compared to later stage investments (Figure 14). This historical trend 
discourages continued investment in early stage investment. Due diligence is a roughly fixed 
cost irrespective of the size of the deal, which also incentivises larger deals for the same cost 
and these larger deals are typically later stage (HMTreasury and BIS 2010). 
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Figure 14 Since inception performance by investment stage and subcategories to December 2009 % 
pa (BVCA 2010) p.5 
Information asymmetry 
The success of an investment will depend on the quality of „deal flow‟ i.e. investment 
opportunities in ventures. The search process of finding promising deal flow suffers from 
information asymmetry as the entrepreneur frequently has better information about their 
venture than the investor (Hall 2005). Knowing how much to disclose not only influences 
investors but also your competitors, but „Even if the entrepreneur understands the value of the 
opportunity, the project will go unfinanced if he or she cannot convey this information to a 
potential financier‟ (Lerner, Shane et al. 2003). Information problems can lead to an 
increasing cost to entrepreneurial financiers, particularly for early stage investments with a 
lack of track record and demonstrability, as investors have difficulty distinguishing between 
good and bad venture investments which increases the cost for all i.e. a “lemons” market20 
(Hall 2005). Under these conditions it is perhaps not surprising that investor‟s value 
credibility and a track record even if in a previous venture. Research indicates first time 
entrepreneurs find it particularly difficult to raise equity finance compared to serial 
entrepreneurs (Gompers, Kovner et al. 2010).  
After investment, staging (i.e. release of funding in tranches against meeting of specific 
milestones) is often introduced as a way of maintaining contact with an investee and so 
improving information transfer between investee and investor. In addition to information 
asymmetries, there can be delays in information as investors wait to see the returns on their 
investments. This can lead to imbalances between the supply and demand in venture capital 
(Gompers and Lerner 2001). 
                                                 
20 As described by Akerlof (1970) 
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Investor influence on venture performance 
Empirical studies reveal inconsistencies on the impact of venture capital on venture 
performance. For example „good VCs‟ are assumed to have more successful portfolios due to 
superior search methods for high growth ventures and offering more support. However this 
performance difference has only been identified by venture capitalists who invest in the 
ventures of first-time entrepreneurs. This effect disappears for entrepreneurs with a track 
record of success, when „...the company is no more likely to succeed if it is funded by a top-
tier venture capital firm than one in the lower tier‟ (Gompers, Kovner et al. 2010) p.19. 
Despite this, the study finds lower firm valuations by first tier VCs compared to second tier 
VCs regardless of the entrepreneur‟s track record. Multivariate analysis shows survival rate 
of firms is 7.6% lower when firms received finance from VCs, and 11.2% lower when they 
received business angel finance (Cowling and Murray 2010). While the involvement of 
equity investors may reduce an entrepreneur‟s likelihood for short run income at the expense 
of longer term growth, the presence of investors on the board may increase the likelihood for 
conflict (Cowling and Murray 2010).  Other studies suggest Venture Capital is 3-4 times 
more powerful than corporate R&D in delivering innovative activity as measured by patents, 
though this research refers to VC from the late 70s to the mid-90s when VC was 3% of 
corporate R&D but responsible for around 10-12% of privately funded innovations (Kortum 
and Lerner 2000). 
Venture capital investment often influences firm strategy as investors seek rapid returns: 
„...after involvement of a venture capitalst, firms switch from innovation to 
commercialisation of their products and therefore are able to realise superior growth 
rates...higher innovativeness of venture funded firms is due to the selection process of 
the venture capitalist prior to the funding rather than to the venture funding itself.‟ 
P.151 (Engel and Keilbach 2007) 
The financial needs of capital investors (e.g. limited partners such as pension funds, high net 
worth individuals, foundations and so on) in venture capital may compel the VC (general 
partner) to focus on a particular investment time frame and exit which does not necessarily fit 
with the productive needs of its portfolio investments. This separation of ownership and 
management risks sophisticated „principal-agent‟ problems where the goals of different 
parties can conflict (Hall 2005). 
 
Exit 
After the initial cash injection in an investee firm a return is typically achieved at the end of 
the investment relationship when an investment is liquidated either by taking the company 
public, selling the company in the private markets, or writing off the bad investment as a loss 
(Krohmer and Lauterbach 2009). 
Whether an exit for the investor is always in the best interest of companies has been 
questioned. For example in a study of cleantech IPOs on the Alternative Investment Market, 
the share price fell after IPO even in cases where revenues were rising (Mueller and Garnsey 
2009). This suggests an IPO was not perhaps appropriate for the long term interests of the 
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portfolio companies. Furthermore, it is suggested that premature stage-gates for development 
were imposed on firms at the very time when they should be flexible to respond to a changing 
business environment and opportunities (Mueller and Garnsey 2009). This may be a 
symptom of increasing divergence between productive and financial capital as suggested by 
Perez (2004).  
The opportunity to exit via IPO is dependent on overall investor confidence in the public 
markets and their appetite for particular classes of investment whether by stage or sector. 
Investments can become under-valued in poor public markets or over-valued when public 
markets boom (Gompers and Lerner 2001). Long waves are discussed in relation to means to 
invest in the next section of this paper, but are closely linked to the performance of public 
markets and thus opportunities for exit via IPO. 
Financing contractual issues 
Entrepreneurs can be influenced by financing contractual issues that can impact the scope and 
scale of investment they seek. Contractual issues between venture capitalists and limited 
partners (capital investors) can also complicate  investment decisions in otherwise attractive 
portfolios  (Denis 2004).  
Mania and crowding 
At times investors have been known to crowd into particular streams of investment 
categories. The likelihood of a belief cascade formation has been associated with a lack of 
information and the exuberant pursuit of classes of technology stocks. Investor 
crowding/herding (e.g. canal mania, railway mania, fibre optic mania, etc.) is linked to 
problems of investment in a narrow selection of firms which can damage the evolution of an 
industry (Nairn 2002; Goldfarb, Kirsch et al. 2007). This can result particularly when 
investment decision makers lack information about the viability of entry strategies of new 
firms which can allow a particular investment strategy (correctly or incorrectly) to cascade 
(Goldfarb, Kirsch et al. 2007). This study showed a halt in investment as the investors in the 
dot.com bubble realised they were backing firms with an entry strategy which was 
inappropriate for the industry, instead of immediate modification of their investment strategy 
(Goldfarb, Kirsch et al. 2007). Crowding into particular streams of investment can also have 
an impact on returns as market opportunities become saturated. 
4.3 Means to invest – raising capital 
Capital is derived from a variety of sources for equity finance. Typically business angels 
invest their own capital, while venture capitalists seek capital from other funds, banks, 
insurance companies, pension funds, corporate investors, individual investors, government 
and other institutions (Mayer, Schoors et al. 2005). For example corporate venture capital has 
contributed between 6-16% of capital compared to total venture capital (Figure 15). Where 
capital is sourced seems to depend on country specific characteristics, for example:  
Outside market systems e.g. US and UK (liberal market economies) – where there is a 
clear separation between „owners‟ and „managers‟. Emphasis on shareholder value 
leading to „downsize and distribute‟ practices. 
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Inside market systems e.g. Germany – where the separation between „owners‟ and 
„managers‟ is less strict. Emphasis on stakeholder value and „retain and reinvest‟ 
practices. 
While these are fairly crude distinctions, they are suggestive of the impact of different social 
systems existing between countries. As a result banks play a more central role in financing 
firms in Germany than Britain and are the major external source of funds for firms (Mayer, 
Schoors et al. 2005). In 2001 bank loans represented 95.54% of corporate credit in Germany 
compared to 62.96% in Britain and 44.57% in the US (Siebert, 2004 p.29 in (Casson, Martin 
et al. 2008). The outside market system has been argued as the most appropriate system for 
radical innovation, especially sectors characterised by novelty, appropriability and visibility 
(Casson, Martin et al. 2008). The inside market system is associated more with the 
development of „middle technology‟ firms as it is a better environment for organisational 
learning and cumulative innovation (O‟Sullivan 2001 cited in Casson et al).  
 
Figure 15 Investments of CVC in the U.S. (Xia, Livesey et al. 2010) p.14 
Regulatory restrictions and tax incentives on investment 
A change in regulatory restrictions can have a large impact on the availability of capital. For 
example in the U.S. the Department of Labor lifted the restrictions on pension fund 
investments in venture capital in 1978 which resulted in a boom in fund-raising for the sector 
(Gompers and Lerner 2001)(Gompers and Lerner p.123). During this period returns declined 
due to a steady demand for venture capital while supply of capital rapidly increased. Capital 
gains tax theoretically has an impact on business angel investment and the contribution of 
high net worth individuals to the availability of capital for other types of venture investment.  
As a reaction to reduced capital resulting from poor returns in early stage investments the UK 
government has introduced a number of tax breaks to make returns more favourable to 
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investors e.g. Venture Capital Trusts (VCT)21 and Enterprise Investment Schemes (EIS)
 22
 
(Gill, Minshall et al. 2007). Public funds now participate in around 42% of venture capital 
deals in the UK (Pierrakis 2010). However it is questioned whether public financing would 
ever invest in ventures otherwise ignored by other financiers (Peneder 2008). Public and 
private partnerships in financing are widely viewed as a way of boosting entrepreneurial 
financing without creating competition between public and private entities and avoiding other 
problems associated with publicly led investments e.g. capped investments  (Lerner 2009; 
Mason and Perrakis 2009). 
Public markets 
The FTSE All Share Index is a representation of broad investor confidence, which in turn is 
linked to the ability to raise venture capital funds (Figure 16). Investor confidence is linked to 
mania and crowding as discussed previously (p.28). Public markets can inflate or constrain 
the availability of external equity financing,and the source of financing can influence firm 
development. For example in biotechnology: „Agreements signed during periods of limited 
external equity financing are more likely to assign the bulk of the control to the larger 
corporate partner, and are significantly less successful than other alliances.‟  (Lerner, Shane 
et al. 2003) P.411 A study of Cambridge technology firms found them highly sensitive to 
cyclical trends in the economy, in part due to cycles of funding availability (Drofiak and 
Garnsey 2009). Even though technology ventures have demonstrated some resilience in the 
past23, they have been showing signs of contraction during the recent economic downturn. 
 
Figure 16 FTSE All Share Index (RH axis) and Global Venture Capital (LH axis): Sources: Office for 
National Statistics and Thomson One 
                                                 
21 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/guidance/vct.htm  
22 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/eis/  (also see http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/research/report.pdf for an evaluation of the scheme). Past 
research suggested more than half of venture investors were identified as tax exempt which would make them ineligible for 
such a scheme, but this research has not been recently updated (Poterba 1989 in Denis p.317). 
23 Cambridge had few significant internet businesses at the time of the dot.com boom and bust and so showed some 
resilience to the dot.com boom and bust. Previous downturns have been associated with the establishment of fewer, but more 
resilient firms. 
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4.4 Impact of long waves on incentives and means to invest 
Understanding the influence of long waves on the incentives and means to invest is complex 
as long waves are an aggregation of economic activity at mutiple industrial levels. There is 
evidence suggesting long waves impact the availability of external equity financing, which in 
turn can impact firms and industry (Gompers, Kovner et al. 2008). Long waves are associated 
with fluctuations in production and prices in addition to structural changes (Mensch, 
Coutinho et al. 1981; Freeman and Louca 2002). There is disagreement about the shape of 
long waves in the economy, with Kondratieff initially suggesting a sinusoidal pattern which 
Mensch revised to a series of sigmoid trends (Figure 17). These waves represent industrial 
fluctuations. While patterns on an aggregate level do emerge, a study of change over time 
presents challenges as while some recurrent themes can be identified in different time 
periods, change itself fundamentally alters the business environment making comparisons 
between different time periods problematic: 
 „Nature is cyclical, but the cycle is not the renewal of the same process again and 
again. And, since change is permanent and irreversible, time repeats never repeating.‟ 
(Freeman and Louca 2002) p.3 
However there are features of industrial and broader economic change which seem repeatable 
so offering a basic framework from which deviations are identified which in turn yield useful 
insights. 
 
Figure 17 The metemorphosis model of long-term industrial fluctuations (Mensch p.277 
 
Mensch theorises that „...basic innovation comes from prior lack of innovation, and the 
subsequent devaluation of capital goods dedicated to old lines of business, and a subsequent 
shift in the propensity to invest in innovation‟ (Mensch, Coutinho et al. 1981) p.282. This 
theme has been built upon by Perez: 
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„Financial capital becomes ready to take risks in it [next technological revolution], 
precisely because the previous trajectories had approached exhaustion....The forces 
helping this exploratory process are crucial for the emergence of the next 
technological revolution and for the articulation of a new paradigm. This is especially 
so given that the overadaptation of the environment to the established paradigm has 
been systematically excluding, underestimating or marginalising the innovations that 
fall outside the established trajectories.‟ P. 88 (Perez 2004) 
She goes on to explore the interaction between technological, economic and institutional 
change as drivers to system dynamics which cause long waves in the economy. These long 
cycles are associated with techno-economic paradigm shifts originally described by Freeman 
(1992), and alterations in industry structures24. An entire cycle spans around half a century, 
with each cycle starting at the end of a prior cycle (Figure 18). 
Definitively demonstrating cycles of paradigmatic shifts and exploring their processes 
remains problematic empirically as these shifts are manifestations of smaller changes which 
coincide to create an aggregated wave of activity. Perez suggests a systems based approach 
linking economic, institutional and technological change as the determinants of wider 
industrial change (Perez 2003). 
 
                                                 
24
 „A decade back, 22 computer outfits made the list. This year the count is 59 and rising, and computer-related 
businesses have continued to rise on the lists. Ranked for market value, Microsoft climbed from 373rd place to 
4th. Intel, 498th in sales ten years ago, has risen to 40th.‟ Forbes 500 – 1997 
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Figure 18 Recurring phases of each great surge in the core countries (modified from Perez 2003 
p.48) 
4.5 Industry level finance 
Investors rarely invest in firms without evidence of industrial legitimacy and growth. Finance 
needs to be available to build the most appropriate industrial structures at the right time. If an 
industry structure becomes defined too early, the variation in solutions will be limited. If it is 
defined too late, effort may be wasted on non-dominant designs and entrepreneurial 
opportunities may move to other regions as industry consolidates.  
Acquiring definitive figures on spend to create industrial structure excluding finance for new 
firms remains incomplete. As an indication of the scale of this type of investment fig 19 
shows UK government spending on activities associated with low carbon technologies. While 
earlier investments in low carbon sectors were dispersed across departments, the government 
has now consolidated spending within the Department for the Environment and Climate 
Change (DECC). 
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  £'000     
  2007-8 2008-9 2009-10 
Fuel poverty 
               
361,795  
               
399,894  
               
429,487  
Carbon Trust 
                 
87,866      
Energy Saving Trust 
                 
28,633  
                 
35,882  
                 
38,525  
International Window of the Environmental Transformation 
Fund   
                 
50,000  
               
100,000  
Climate change research 
                 
19,033      
Global Threat Reduction programme 
                 
40,601  
                 
35,943  
                 
36,044  
Environmental Transformation Fund 
                 
33,892  
                 
68,921  
                 
50,858  
Regional Development Agencies   
                 
40,800  
                 
45,824  
Low Carbon Buildings Programme   
                   
5,731  
                 
38,841  
Carbon Budgets (includes Low Carbon Investment Fund and 
elements of Carbon Trust not in other lines)   
                 
49,279  
               
102,911  
Carbon Capture and Storage   
                   
6,459  
                   
9,309  
Energy Efficiency Loans     
                 
15,762  
Boiler Scrappage     
                 
20,601  
Other programme spend   
                 
63,448  
                 
64,882  
TOTAL 
               
571,820  
               
756,357  
               
953,044  
Figure 19 DECC expenditure on low carbon programmes 
Some of the instruments shown in Figure 19 relate to market incentives, such as the Low 
Carbon Buildings Programme which offered grants to homeowners and organisations for 
renewables. Others were focused on educating the market through the Energy Saving Trust 
and Carbon Trust. This offers some insight into the kinds of industry and market building 
activities that occur in addition to funds for new ventures. 
5 Discussion 
The literature review reveals the importance of context when exploring the link between 
finance, innovation and emerging industries. As is often described in research methodology 
texts, theory development is as much about identifying phenomena as understanding when 
they are likely to arise (Snow and Thomas 1994; Carlisle and Christensen 2005).  
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The literature indicates that many more business ideas are generated than successfully 
commercialised; therefore suggesting that factors influencing the emergence of an industry 
occur predominantly outside the science base assuming a certain threshold of activity is 
achieved. New firms are associated with the introduction of radical and disruptive 
innovations that typically punctuate the early stages of industrial emergence, though it is also 
recognised that funding new firms alone is insufficient for industrial emergence. 
Entrepreneurial finance is a critical resource in the development and growth of many new 
firms.  
Much of the work on entrepreneurial finance can be split broadly into two groups: 
- Work examining the relationship between entrepreneurial finance and the ventures 
who seek investment 
- Research exploring the macroeconomic impact of entrepreneurial finance  
To date few works have attempted to understand the role of finance on the emergence of 
industries. In part this can be explained by the complexity of studying emerging industries, as 
identified in a recent review (Forbes and Kirsch 2010). While entrepreneurial finance 
includes a range of financial instruments, the majority of work has focused on venture capital 
and public markets as these also have the most data. Nonetheless the literature indicates 
several features of entrepreneurial financing that may affect the rate of industrial emergence, 
which our work is continuing to explore in more depth with the support of qualitative and 
quantitative data. Of concern is the ability to direct resources towards those activities most 
likely to contribute to the emergence of an industry. This requires a more complete 
perspective of industrial emergence rather than a reliance on a linear innovation process 
where funding gaps are identified and filled. The literature for example suggests 
entrepreneurs may experience greater difficulty accessing required finance when they are first 
time entrepreneurs and operating in emerging industries. While declines in the availability of 
entrepreneurial financing may occur, they do not necessarily reflect a decline in the financing 
needs of investable firms. Instead the supply of entrepreneurial finance seems predominantly 
driven by other factors in the business environment, such as the confidence in public markets. 
In addition to the amount of financing available, further work is needed to understand the 
implications of information delays regarding the performance of investments, the advantages 
and disadvantages of introducing measures enabling information transfer between investor 
and investee, plus positive and negative effects of investor mania on industrial emergence.  
The entrepreneurial financing industry continues to release reports arguing more money will 
lead to more innovation and the creation of new industries, yet the literature suggests the 
relationship is not as straightforward as such claims suggest. Our ongoing research aims to 
show the complex relationship between entrepreneurial finance and emerging industries, and 
the limitations and strengths of entrepreneurial finance in supporting emerging industries.  
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